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How does one write the history of yesterday so that students will read it tomorrow?  For 
anyone over the age of 30, the events of the Cold War, especially its stunning end in the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the failed Moscow putsch, are framed still by the CNN 
logo beneath the news reports we breathlessly watched.  But most undergraduates, of 
course, are younger than 21; the freshmen who will enter history classes this fall were 
infants when Václav Havel stood above the crowds demanding the fall of the 
Czechoslovak Communist regime.  How does one describe for such students a time 
when the greatest threat was not one suitcase nuclear bomb, but thousands of atomic-
tipped ICBMs? 
John Lewis Gaddis seems to have found the key to good history in Coleridge’s dictum 
for good poetry – make the familiar strange and the strange familiar.  Gaddis, the Robert 
A. Lovett Professor of History at Yale University, already has  harvested his share of 
groundbreaking scholarship from Soviet archives that opened (briefly) after 
Communism’s collapse; readers looking for stunning revelations would be better served 
by picking up We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Gaddis’ 1998 refutation of 
many a revisionist’s nostrums.  The Cold War, by contrast, is Gaddis’ attempt to tell the 
story of the Cold War in an entirely fresh voice.  Gone is the author as scholar revisiting 
old arguments with new facts; in steps the author as raconteur, starting the whole 
narrative from scratch. 
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It is a tribute to the powers of Gaddis’ imagination that a man who knows the trenches of 
academic debate so well could find the strength to rise above them.  The key to Gaddis’ 
success is to pick an unusual angle on a familiar and important event, then let that new 
perspective lead his narrative away from the clichés.  In Gaddis’ account of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, we find no tales that could serve as a caption to the shop-worn image of 
Kennedy hunched over his desk; instead, we hear Khrushchev crow that he’ll “throw a 
hedgehog at Uncle Sam’s pants.”  Reagan’s speeches are  recounted affectionately in 
detail as they ratcheted up US pressure on a perturbed Kremlin, but Gaddis will not let 
readers forget that Reagan’s more sentimental side sometimes failed to impress his 
own staff.  When Reagan once wanted to soften his rhetoric, he revised a speech by 
adding his own homespun account of how an American couple might discuss foreign 
policy with “Ivan and Anya.”  Gaddis takes us to the sleeve of a White House staffer 
looking over the revised draft and wondering aloud: “Who wrote this sh—?”
Sometimes Gaddis stretches so far for a fresh perspective on the Cold War that he 
teeters at the top of shaky metaphors.  Yes, Ronald Reagan was a professional actor 
before he entered politics; yes, John Paul II was an amateur playwright and actor in his 
native Krakow.  But, does this mean that every figure from the transformative 1980s, 
from Lech Walesa to Margaret Thatcher, must have their careers recast in theatrical 
language?  All the world may well be a stage, but these men and women liberated 300 
million souls and overthrew the most enduring tyranny of the 20th century.  Surely they 
were more than just players?
More successful are Gaddis’ unusual comparisons in the course of more traditional 
political analysis.  Rarely in an account of the Cold War, for example, has Woodrow 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points played such a prominent role, but Gaddis, noting that Wilson 
hoped to counter the threat of international Communism, convincingly argues that one 
can frame the Cold War as a battle between the heirs of Wilson’s liberalism and those 
inspired by Lenin’s revolutionary tracts.  We remember the damage done in the 20th 
century by the ill-advised application of the principle of “self-determination,” but do we 
give Wilson credit often enough for enunciating the principles of free trade and 
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democratic alliances that were to become tools of postwar containment?  By starting 
with Wilson’s idealism, moreover, Gaddis has the chance to draw a clear line 
connecting the dots of 20th century American foreign policy with a simple idea: that 
America prevailed over the Soviet Union because it was grounded in principles that 
inspired strong alliances but also engendered good will among Americans towards their 
allies. 
Chief among these was a certain humility toward the lessons of history – a humility that 
doctrinaire Communists could never match.  Unlike the liberals, Gaddis writes, 
Communists were convinced that their theory of history “which cut through complexity 
while abolishing ambiguity” could “point the way” to history’s ultimate destination while 
“only dictators, who provided the necessary discipline, could ensure arrival at the 
intended destination.”  Liberals, on the other hand, “never bought into any single, 
sacrosanct, and therefore unchallengeable theory of history.” 
Gaddis’ careful enunciation of this simple, but important, lesson may well be the most 
important lesson that The Cold War has to teach to the first generation that did not grow 
up in the shadow of the Soviet Union.  Having been liberated from the cruelest of the 
regimes to hoist his portrait above its parades, Marx, along with his monocausal vision 
of human history, is now very much back in vogue among a generation that sees 
economic interests behind the White House’s every foreign policy choice.  We can only 
hope that undergraduates who read Gaddis will learn that simplistic explanations of 
history can be as deadly as they are dull.
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